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Bermúdez (2005)
problem” the question of clarifying how
typical subpersonal explanations in cog-
nitive sciences, whatever is their specific
form, are related to folk psychology. In
this opinion article we will approach the
interface problem from a specific angle,
i.e., the relationship between conscious-
ness and the unconscious as it has taken
shape within cognitive sciences.
Our starting point is the contrast
between the cognitive unconscious and
the Freudian one. If examined from an
orthodox cognitivist point of view, psy-
choanalysis turns out to be a brilliant
but failed attempt to build a genuine
subpersonal psychology. Freud aims to
go beyond the psychology of his times,
which is a psychology of conscious-
ness; his theory of the unconscious
is, therefore, programmatically against
a “consciousness-centric” mentalistic
framework. The problem is that, as a mat-
ter of fact, Freud failed to extricate himself
from that framework. Like many psycho-
analytic ideas, the Freudian unconscious
is just an enlargement, or extension, of a
psychology—folk psychology—hinged on
the idea of a person who is able to have
conscious mental experiences.
According to a number of philosophers
this extension of our ordinary psycho-
logical conception of mind is a strength
of psychoanalytic theory. In this perspec-
tive, the grounds for psychoanalysis “lie
in its offering a unified explanation for
phenomena (dreaming, psychopathology,
mental conflict, sexuality, and so on) that
commonsense psychology is unable, or
poorly equipped, to explain” (Gardner,
1999, p. 684). This approach has been
taken as the basis of a defense of psy-
choanalysis against well-known epistemo-
logical objections: like folk-psychological
explanations, psychoanalytic explanations
should be exempt from the epistemolog-
ical and methodological requirements of
experimental science (Manson, 2003, p.
179). Donald Davidson is one the referents
of this conception of psychoanalysis. On
his view the personal level is autonomous
and different from the subpersonal one,
and is to be studied by means of dif-
ferent methods: you need hermeneutics,
not the quest for natural laws. That is,
the folk-psychological explaining is here
viewed as an interpretive activity aimed
to give sense to behavior—to “rational-
ize” it. Accordingly, when one runs across
such a “pathology” of reason as self-
deception, the personal psychology frame-
work is not to be given up in favor of
the subpersonal one, but rather it must
be enlarged or extended so that one can
find somewhere else the rationality set out
by the principle of charity. In this vein,
the psychoanalytic partitioning the mind
is seen as a metaphoric device to coher-
ently describe within the personal-level
explanatory framework a phenomenon
(self-deception) that otherwise would be
uninterpretable (Davidson, 1982).
This attempt to abandon Freud’s pos-
itivistic naturalism and reconstruct psy-
choanalysis on hermeneutic grounds has
a very long story. In the 1970s an influ-
ent version of this project was initiated by
a number of psychoanalysts of Rapaport’s
school; especially George Klein and, close
to his ideas, Roy Schafer. According
to these psychoanalysts the “biologistic”
Freud is no longer defensible, and the
whole Freudian metapsychology is to be
declared waned owing to its association
to the drive-discharge theory. By con-
trast, we have to reconsider the psycho-
analytic clinical theory insofar as it rests
on the intentionality of the interpretive
process.
This “clinical theory versus metapsy-
chology” argument, however, tries to
regenerate psychoanalysis by renouncing
to its main legacy. For Freud’s hypothesis
of a biological component that is consti-
tutive of mental life is just what ensures
for the psychoanalytic theory its typical
content of systematic objection against the
claim of self-legitimation made by rational
consciousness: therefore, it is the ground
of the very idea of a subpersonal-level
unconscious. The Freudian hypothesis, to
the extent that it views human subject as
“tossed about” by its own biologicity, rules
out that inner life can regain its own center
in the free intentionality of consciousness.
Vice versa, a psychoanalytic hermeneutics
entirely aimed at insisting on the theme of
meaning at the expense of the “blind” and
“biological” theme of drive dynamics, runs
the risk of surreptitiously reintroducing
the pre-Freudian picture of the conscious
subject as primary subject.
In this perspective, the hermeneuti-
cal approach to psychoanalysis is to be
contrasted with the project of replac-
ing Freud’s positivistic naturalism with
a neurocognitive naturalism (see, e.g.,
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the writings of other two members of
Rapaport’s group: Holt, 1989; Rubinstein,
1997). Thus, a dynamic psychology that
aims to develop psychoanalytic theo-
ries under the guidance of cognitive
sciences fully confirms the critical con-
tent of Freud’s theory of unconscious,
i.e., its being a repertoire of tools to
penetrate the self-defensive nature of
self-conscious subjectivity. But here the
Freudian personal-level unconscious is
superseded by a level of analysis that
aspires to be genuinely subpersonal: the
information-processing level, wedged
between the personal sphere of phe-
nomenology and the subpersonal domain
of neurobiological events.
However, the advantage of a dynamic
psychology driven by cognitive sciences
against the hermeneutical approach to
psychoanalysis might turn out to be prob-
lematic. The reason lies in the convergence
of two related issues: the interface prob-
lem and “the mark of the mental” prob-
lem. If we try to solve the former in a
strong reductive way, the personal mind
is to be defined in terms of the subper-
sonal mind. But then the question arises
whether we can really explain when a sub-
personal phenomenon deserves the title of
mental without any reference to personal,
folk-psychological concepts. In the case
of a negative answer, the overall strategy
of superseding personal with subpersonal
psychology would be in danger.
Let us see in more details how the prob-
lem arises. Any bottom-up approach to
cognition that rejects the primacy of the
personal level should explain how the per-
sonal phenomena described by common-
sense psychology in terms of conscious,
deliberate, linear processes, which intro-
duce “prescriptive or normative” concepts
that “have no echo in physical theory”
(Bermúdez, 2005, p. 44), are in fact a prod-
uct of unconscious, automatic, parallel,
sub-personal mechanisms. If that is so, the
attempt of the radical naturalist to explain
the genesis of personal-level psychology
starting from sub-personal, unconscious
mechanisms is quite demanding, since the
gap between the two levels looks wide
and deep.
Apparently, the radical naturalist has a
simple way out: the concepts that “have no
echo in physical theory” should be elim-
inated from scientific psychology just as
it happened in the past, when scientific
progress led to drop the protoscientific
theories of phlogiston and caloric fluid.
Commonsense psychological explanation
should not be taken at its face value, but
(at best) as a useful device for practical
purposes. But now the mark of the cogni-
tive problem strikes: the radical naturalist
who rejects the intuitions about the men-
tal embedded in our folk-psychological
explanatory practices must offer a crite-
rion to distinguish the sub-personal pro-
cesses that are genuinely mental from
those that are not. Without such a cri-
terion, the emancipation of subpersonal
from personal psychology is illusory. Yet,
the task of making a principled distinc-
tion is not an easy one. For it is quite
obvious that in the brain there are many
unconscious, automatic, parallel mecha-
nisms that, albeit not mental in nature,
have a basic role in the existence of mental-
ity. As Damasio (2010, p. 73) noticed, for
example, certain brain regions such as the
spinal cord and the cerebellum give contri-
bution to essential brain functions, but are
not essential to mind-making.
In other words, when we try to under-
stand the relation between subpersonal
and personal levels of psychological expla-
nation, we face a dialectic between depen-
dence and autonomy. If we consider the
personal mind as completely autonomous,
we fall in hermeneutics and in anti-
naturalism, losing contact with the scien-
tific development. If we adopt a strong
vision of the thesis of dependency, we
end up adopting eliminative or reductive
approaches that are at risk of losing the
mental as their own object of study, replac-
ing it with objects that belong to different
levels of analysis. That being so, the wisest
strategy may be to pursue reflective equi-
librium between dependence and auton-
omy, namely, working back and forth
between the ordinary image of ourselves as
self-conscious, intentional, rational agents,
and the scientific conception of ourselves
as biochemically-implemented computa-
tional machines, by revising these two
images wherever necessary so as to pur-
sue the regulative ideal of a coherent
self-conception.
A good example of a research area in
which a dialectical relationship between
personal and subpersonal levels of analy-
sis turned out to be extremely fruitful is
provided by the way in which psycholog-
ical constructs very close to the personal
level such as motivation and attachment
served as bridges between dynamic psy-
chology and cognitive sciences.
The notions of motivation and attach-
ment are at the core of contemporary
psychodynamic theories that are fruitfully
interacting with cognitive sciences (see,
e.g., Fonagy et al., 2002; Lichtenberg et al.,
2011). Now, the constructs of motivation
and attachment can be definitely consid-
ered an advancement over the concepts
that were formerly used to account for
the same phenomena. But as we said,
the concepts of motivation and attach-
ment are very close to the personal level,
and what is more they are not very
precise. In other terms, their usefulness
notwithstanding, they did not undergo
that process of “fragmentation and recon-
figuration” through which experimental
psychology and cognitive neuroscience
have put folk-psychological categories like
attention or memory (Churchland, 1986,
p. 365). What can be said in favor of moti-
vation and attachment is that these con-
cepts are more precise and work better
than others.
Therefore, when the term “motivation”
is defined as the whole spectrum of those
factors that trigger, maintain, intensify,
modulate or terminate physical activities
or psychological events of any kind, we
easily realize that it is a term that groups a
heterogeneous bunch of factors, which are
very difficult to classify (Jervis, 1993, pp.
288–289). At times such factors are to be
examined one by one; but often it is use-
ful to consider them all together under the
label “motivations.” The main point here
is that in any case the use of such term was
a conceptual progress—e.g., over the 19th
Century concept of will.
The term “attachment” too does
not refer to a homogeneous and well-
identifiable phenomenon; it is a “bond,”
a term that is to be strictly and exclu-
sively construed as a metaphor. There are
attachment behaviors (due to different
factors), and there are subjective experi-
ences of attachment, which also can barely
be grouped together and classified; but
attachment in itself is an idea between the
imaginative and the abstract, which orig-
inates from the extension of expressions
such as “to keep attached” or “adhered.”
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1165 | 2
Di Francesco and Marraffa A plea for a more dialectical relationship
The epistemological moral that can be
drawn from this case of dialectic inter-
action between personal and subpersonal
levels of investigation can be concisely
expressed in the following way. According
to the eliminativists, history of psychology
consists in a linear process through which
the systematic research supersedes and
goes beyond commonsense psychology—
and together with it philosophical psychol-
ogy. But things are more complicated. The
progress of psychology is not due only to
the elimination of the concepts (and the
models and metaphors) of commonsense
psychology in favor of the constructs of
scientific psychology. Sometimes progress
occurs because non-strictly scientific and
unclear concepts are superseded by new
concepts that are as much insufficiently
scientific and yet more appropriate and
precise (Jervis, 2011, p. 167).
Thus, there can definitely be terms
of the personal-level psychology that are
“unsuited per se for scientific or theoreti-
cal purposes” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 196). The
aforementioned concept of will is a case
in point. However, in other cases—like
those of “motivation” and “attachment”—
the ontological vagueness of a concept
may be compensated by pragmatic virtues
such as, e.g., the potential to increase
the explanatory resources in some area
of scientific psychology. In short, the
eliminativist primacy of metaphysical con-
siderations over the epistemological ones
cannot be generalized: it is necessary to
evaluate on a case-by-case basis.
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